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Resu111en: En su libro Making Things Happen (2003), James Woodward propone una teorfa 
intervenc ionis ta de la causal idad. Esta teorfa adopta como elemento esencial el aniil is is 
contrafiict ico de aserciones causal es. ~Como debe entenderse e interpretarse un contrafiict ico 
desde esta teorfa intervencionista? Para responder esta pregunta, tomare como gufa la 
propuesta de David Le·w is en su artfculo "Causation" (1979). El objetivo de este artfculo es 
comparar y d iferenc iar las propuestas de Le'Nis y Woodward; se mostrarii como Wood'Nard 
logra evitar algunas objeciones estiindar a la teorfa de Le,N is, asf como algunos nuevos 
problemas que Woodward debe enfrentar. El artfculo se divide en tres partes. Primero, 
presentare brevemente las ideas centrales de la teorfa intervenc ionista de la causal idad; en 
seguida, exp I icare la necesidad de adoptarun anru is is contrafiict ico en dicha teor fa, esbozando 
de pasada la teorfa contrafiictica de la causalidad de Lewis y sus d iferenc ias con Woodvvard. 
Finalmente, en la tercera parte examinare la noci6n de intervenci6n, el concepto central en 
la teorfa intervenc ionista, desde la perspectiva contrafiict ica, para asf presentar un problema 
fundan1ental en la teorfa de Woodward. 
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Abstract: In h is book Making Things Happen (2003), Jan1es Woodward proposes an 
in terventionist account of causat ion. Such account requires the adoption of acounterfactual 
analysis of causal claims. Ho'Never, ho'N should counterfactual claims be understood and 
in terpreted from an interventionist standpoint? I will try to answer this quest ion taking as 
a guide the influent ial account of counterfactuals presented by David Le-vv is in h is famous 
paper "Causation" (1979). The ain1 of this paper is to out! ine some general considerations 
that sho-vv hovv Wood-vvard's counterfactual analys is differs from Lewis's, thus g-ain ing 
immunity against classical object ions to Le'Nis's analysis, and to present some difficulties of 
Woodvvard's own approach. The paper is divided in three parts. F irst, I will present briefly 
the main ideas of the manipulabil ity theory of causation; in the second part, I will introduce 
the necessity of adopting a counterfactual analysis in such an account, follo-vved by a brief 
presentat ion of Lewis's theory as well as the d ifferences and s imilarities ·with Woodward's 
approach. F inally, in the third part I will examine the notion of intervent ion, a key concept 
in the manipulability account, from the standpoint of counterfactual analysis, and present 
a problem with Woodward's overall account. 
Keywords: causation, manipulat ion, counterfactuals, Woodward, Le'N is 
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I. I NTERVENTI ON AND CAUSATION 
The main idea behind the manipulab ility theory of causat ion can be summar ized in t he 
follovv ing principle: X is a cau se of Y if man ipulation on X brings about man ipul ation o n Y 
More prec isely, X cau ses Y if intervent ion on X's values constitutes a n intervent ion on Y's 
values. As an example, take the intervent ion on the possible values of a light svvitch (up-dovvn) 
as br inging about in terven t ion on a light bulb' s possible values (on-ofl).1 W hile th is appears 
straig htforvvardly as a c ircular accoun t of causat ion, expla ining t he not io n of "cause" by 
means of the concept of "in ter ven t ion",3 Woodvvard clarifies that h is account is not meant to 
be reduct ive, but illuminat ing. That is, one of h is main goals is not to reduce t he concept of 
cau sation to another, more basic or well-defined non-causal concept, but rather to elucidate the 
con tent of causal assert ion s in scientific and everyday contexts. T hus, accord ing to Woodvvard .• 
the content of causal utterances is not so much about tr ansference of energy o r similar ity 
between possible worlds,4 but rather about informat ion suscept ible to possible man ipulation. 
We vv ill not consider the extensive defense of th is assertion, but r ather its consequences. It 
is important to note, hovvever, t hat Woodvvard' s project is not a mere description of standard 
usage of t he concept of causation; it has a normative, rev isio nar y aspect to it that stipulates 
what people ought to mean vvhen uttering causal claims. 
Such clarification of vvhat is meant by the concept of "causation" is called for in the general 
context o f explanation. According to Woodward, vvhat is character istic of a causal explanation is 
that it shows how an event, the e.xplanandum, depends on a set of d iffe rent fac tors, the e.xplanans. The 
goal of causal explanations is thus to prov ide information susceptible of manipulation; there is a 
practical side to the genesis of the concept of "cause". Woodward, in a natu ral istic trend, presents 
examples tal<en from empir ical psychology to conclude that the concept of causation vvas probably 
formed due to its practical benefits for su rv ival. Such practical benefit is evidenced in the fact that 
because of our possession of the r elation of causat ion, vve can manipulate or exer t control over 
one of the relata (effect s) v ia the other relata (causes). As D ickenson & Shanks (I995) put it, it is 
"the capacity to control rather than just react to the environment that prov ided the impetus fo r the 
evolution of a m ind and a nervous system capable of representing causal ity" (quoted in Woodvvard 
2003 3 4). This remark seeks to place humans into a Skinnerian cond itioned environment rather 
than in the classical Pavlovian cond itioned environment, and emphasizes the importance of act ion 
and control in the content of the concept of causation over the simple association of a passive, 
empiricist approach: the Humean condit ion is not necessarily the human condition after al l. 
W ithout further exposit ion of the technical details, let us novv list t he central condit ions and 
defin it ions of the manipulability theory of causation: 
1. Stif.ficient Condition: If there is a possible in tervention that changes X's values in a way such 
that perfor m ing this intervention (and no other ) changes Y's values, then X causes Y [sc] 
' Woodward al so admits non-binary values as mappings onto the real numbers, a mapping that doesn't need to be 
that of a mathematical fanction (i t's not one-to-one, i.e. different real nu1nber s can yield the sa1ne value). 
; To intervene can be understood a s "to break the causal chain". Therefore, "intervention" is a causal concept itself, 
motivating the circularity argun1ent exposed. 
' This refers to two reductive theories of causation: Salmon's 'mechanical' theorv and Lewis's counterfactual 
• 
theorv . 
• 
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2 . NecessaT)' Condztzon: If X causes Y, then there is a possible 1ntervent1on on X's values 
such that performing it changes Y's values. [M:] 
3. Total Cause. X is a total cause of Y if, and only if. there is a possible intervention on X 
that changes the values of Y [nc] 
4. Direct Cause. X 1s a direct cause of Y if there is a possible intervention on X that changes 
Y's values. while the remaining events Z of the causal system are fixed on a specific value 
• 
by means of interventions (ceterzs paribus clause). [nc] 
5. Contnbutzve Cause. If X is a contributive cau se of Y. then either (a) X is a direct cause 
of Y or (b) there is a causal chain X-Z -Z -... -Z -Y such that between each successive link 
I 2 n 
there is a d irect cause relation. [cc] 
Now. given this general outl ine of a manipulability theory of causation, 'vve must ask a key 
quest ion t hat any manipulabil ity approach has to face: What happens "vhen intervent ion is. for 
practical, technological. or moral reasons, not possibl e? Given the above conditions, it 'vvould 
appear t hat given such a case 'vvhere intervent ion is not vvithin our reach. no causat ion is present, 
since ex h:Jpothesz there vvould be no information susceptible of manipulation. T his conclusion 
would directly contravene the goal of the conceptual elucidation that Wood..,vard advocates, 
because we 'vvould be forced to deny, for example, that there is a causal 1 ink betvveen the Moon 
and the rise of the tides. A major desideratum of Woodvvard's account is to avoid contradiction, 
vvhenever possible. "vith common-sense, scientific and everyday causal assertions. given that his 
goal 1s semantic elucidation. In addition, the manipulability account seems to imply a sort of 
anthropomorphism insofar as it relies on a notion of intervention that refers to our interventions, 
or interventions performed by us, the human species.5 To solve these issues. two tactics 'vv1ll be 
necessary: on the one hand. vve will need to introduce counterfactual analysis: on the other hand, 
a pr·ecise formal definition of the notion of "intervention" 1s called for. In the next section vve 
will deal first with the inti·oduction of counterfactual analysis. 
2. CoUNTERFACTUALs AND CAUSATION 
It is uncontroversinl, however, that causal relationships exist and that explnnntion is poss ible in 
circumstances in vvhich nctual mnnipulntion is impossible, ·whether for prncticnl or o ther sorts of 
reo..sons ( ... )The notion of informntion that is relevnnt to n1nn ipulation thus need to be understood 
modo.lly or counterfnctunlly. (Woodward 2003 10) 
We have seen the necessity of adopting counterfactual claims in order to comply 'vv ith the 
goal of semantic elucidation. So, to retake the example of the lo.st section. vve vvould have 
that the Moon actually is t he cause of the r ise of the t ides. even if we are currently unable to 
intervene in its orbital path or mass quantity, because if r.ue r.uere to intervene on it s orb it or 
constitution. the tides iuouldchange. T he sort of counterfactual claims that can help us elucidate 
the semantic content of causal claims are, therefore, counterfactual claims s;·stematzcall)· associated 
vv1th h:Jpothetzcal interventions (Woodvvard 2003 122). The association. as vve "viii see eventually, 
is heavily based on abst1·act models. such as structural equations and graphs. Let us no'vv recast 
the cond1t1ons of the manipulability account in terms of counterfactual claims: 
I will not tre:i.t this objection here. See Woodw:i.rd' s w:i.y out on (2003 98) 
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I. Sufficient Condition: If there is a possible intervent ion that changes X's values such that, 
if it vvere to be car r ied out, it 'livould change the values of Y, then X causes Y [sc] 
2. Necessary Condition: If X causes Y, then there is a possible in tervention t hat changes X's 
values such that, if it 'livere to be carried out, it would change Y's values. [NC] 
A similar translation in to cou nterfactu al for m can be made on the definition s of the 
different types of causes. In do ing so, we can see t hat t he manipul ability account is, essent ial ly, 
a counter fac tual account of causation, insofar as every true causal claim is systematically 
assoc iated 'livith a true counterfactual claim. It is for this reason t hat Woodvvard states that 
a satisfactory causal explanation ought to anS'liver a ivhat-if-things-had-been-dijferent question 
by providing a true counterfactual cla im 'livhere the explanandum varies in accordance to 
variat ion in t he e.x-planans(2003 II) . Let us no'liv recast the relationship betvveen a cau sal relat ion 
and an associated t rue counterfactual cla im using t he standard notation in the analysis of 
counterfac tual s: 
I. sc*: I f "X o- Y" is true, then X cau ses Y 
2. NC*: I f X causes Y, then "X o- Y" is true. 
Here, the proposition "X o- Y" stands for t he counterfactua l relationship bet'liveen Y's 
values and changes in X's values. T h is rephrasing of sc and NC constitutes a clear enunc iat ion 
of t he assoc iation bet'liveen a causal claim and a counterfactual statement. I t is clear, hovvever, 
that not just any type of counter factual w ill do. It is s imply not true t hat the Moon causes t he 
tides if the counterfactual "If I 'livere to jog, I 'livould be in a bet ter shape" turns out to be true. 
The type of counter factual cla im associated to a causal cla im must be ~stematically associated; 
Woodward phrases this as infor mation about a pattern of counterfactual dependence (200.3 
11 ). W hat prov ides such informat ion, or put in other words, what enables such systematic 
assoc iations? T he ans'liver I ies in a certain appropriate understanding of counter factual cla ims 
(ibidem). 
So far, 'live have sho'livn that the manipulability theory of causation, qv..a counter fac tual account,, 
rests on a certa in 'livay of understand ing and analyzing counter fac tual claims, in a 'livay such that 
the requ ired systematic association bet'liveen these sort of claims and causal claims is prov ided. 
So it is no'liv natural to ask: Ho'liv counterfactual s should be understood? What is t his appropriate 
under standing of counter factuals that is necessary to y ield non-tr ivial, non-spurious causal 
relations? What are the truth-cond itions of counterfactual claims appropr iately understood? 
T hese are no t novel quest ion s; 20th century metaphys icians have tried relentlessly to clarify the 
logic of these subjunctive claims. Let's br iefly present the d ifficul ty of inter preting counter factual 
claims g iven t he t radit ional logical apparatus. 
The 'material im p! ication', as defined by Whitehead &. Russell C>), fails to proper ly capture 
' the sense of counter factual claims. T he truth-condit ions of a PE Q proposition state that it 
is true 'liVhenever the antecedent P is fa] se. Ho,vever, not every su bjunctive condit ional is true 
g iven t hat the antecedent is false. For example, if X is such that it's impossible for it to ever 
happen, and Y d id happen, then it's not obv ious that the counterfactual "I f X had happened, Y 
had happened" is t rue. C. I. Levv is' s 'strict imp! icat ion' al so fa il s to represent what is meant by a 
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counterfactual claim in the context of causation. The reason is that vve understand causation as 
a relation that holds in v irtue of empirical happenings, not in virtue of logical or metaphysical 
reasons. That a proposition stating Y's occurrence is necessarily implied by a proposition stating 
X's occurrence, vvhile could be captur ing the concept of a necessary cond ition for causation 
betvveen X and Y, fa ils to explains cases of sufficient causat ion. For example, I throw a bottle 
at a rock and it breaks; it is simply not true that the bottle's breaking vvas necessarily caused by 
my throvving it in to a rock; it could have been also caused by my stomping on it. My throvving 
was sufficient, alas not necessary. for the bottle's breaking. 
So the question remains: What are the truth-condition s of counter factual claims, such as "I f 
X had happened . Y had happened"? T he search for criteria seems to be doomed to speculation, 
g iven not only the dependence of counterfactuals on context, but also the occasional vagueness 
of the ir meaning. Cons ider an example due to Qu ine: If Julius Caesar had been in charge of the 
u1-1' s army in the Korean confl ict, then he vvould have u sed (a) nuclear vveapons, or (b) catapults. 
Is the counterfactual vvith (a) as a consequent true, and false othervvise? W hat must be accounted 
for to decide th is? Julius Caesar's psychology? Perhaps h is preference for novel vveapons? Does 
it even make sense to imagine such a situation? Instead of trying to provide ansvvers to these 
questions, let me focus on cases vvhere it does seem to make sense to imagine counter factual 
situations, and vvhere t he truth or falsity of counterfactual claims seems to be clearly stipulated, 
somevvhere in the middle ground between material an str ict implicat ion (Collins et al. 2004 
.3). David Levv is's influential approach will serve us as a guide towards clar ifying Woodvvard's 
approach to counterfactual analysis. 
Lewis's central notion in h is analysis of counter factual s, employing poss ible vvorld semantics, 
is the notion of comparat ive similarity. It is defined as a relation R between possible vvorlds 
w vvith in a set W of all t he possible wor lds, thus defin ing a triple <W, R, w>. Comparative 
similarity then orders, albe it vvealdy,6 all the w
1
with respect to the actual vvorld. A vvorld vv
1 
vv ill 
be closer to the actual vvorld than a vvorld w 
2 
if it is more similar to the actual vvor ld than w 
2 
is. 
Similar ity betvveen vvorlds includes not only similarity vvith respect to general natural lavvs, but 
al so with respect to concrete events. Given this modal approach, "A o-+ B" is defined to be true 
if: (a) T here are no possible worlds vvhere A is t rue, or (b) a vvorld vv; where A and Bare true is 
closer to the actual world than any o ther vvorld vvhere A is true and Bis false (1979 16.3-1 66). 
Levvis then makes propositions A and B represen t the occurrence of actual events, call them/ 
and g respectively, in the standard form of O(f) ("f occurs") and O(g) ("g occurs"). Novv Levvis 
is in a position to state that the event g depends counterfactually on the event f if, and only if, 
the counterfactual "•O(f) o -+ • O(g)" is t rue. Novv, since counterfactual dependence imp! ies 
causation, vve vvould then have that/would be the cause of g. 
Independently of objections posed to Lewis's counterfactual analysis, let us novv pick up 
Woodvvard vvere vve I eft him and compare the compatib ii ity of Levv is' s account of counter factual s 
with the man ipulability account of causat ion. Primafacie, it's fair to say that Levvis's analysis is 
incompatible vvi th Woodvvard's approach for tvvo reasons: on the one hand, if vve accept Levvis's 
analysis as an appropriate interpretation of counterfactual claims in the manipulability account, 
6 This order ing is weak because there can be 1nore than one possible world standing in the same degree of si1nilar-
i tv with the actual world. 
-
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we vvould be inconsistent vvith the semantic elucidation goal that Woodvvard has set himself to 
achieve. It's quite implausible that scientific as vvell as everyday uses of counterfactual cla ims 
involve using Levvis' s similarity metric (Woodvvard 2003 137). On the other hand, Levvis' s approach 
is inevitably reductive. In a comparison w ith Levvis, Woodvvard states that "[Lewis's] idea is to 
define the notion of causation in terms of a more general notion of counterfactual dependence 
that does not itself presuppose causal notions" (2003 136). The manipulability account of causation 
cannot aspire to such a reduction, as its main tenets involve a notion in the conceptual v icin ity 
of the concept of causation itself, z.e the notion of znterventzon. 
c 
E2 
(Fig. 1) 
D Desp ite the crucial d ifferences betvveen Levvis and Woodvvard, there 
are nonetheless important points of 
sim ilarity. One of these is the verdict 
that both Woodvvard's and Levvis' s 
approaches vvould prov ide in regurds to 
the truth of counterfactual claims. To illustrate this point, consider a cause C that is the common 
cause of two effects, E
1 
and E3 
Let us now examine the truth value of the claim "If E, had not occurred, E, had not 
occurred", represented as "-.O(E,) ® -.O(E,)". What is at stake here is the problem of spurious 
correlations that yield false causal claims; vvhile it may be true that E, and E, are correlated, 
it's false to state that one of them causes the other. Theories of causation must prove their 
vvorth by avoid ing this problem, ruling the counterfactual claim above as false, and Woodvvard' s 
and Levvis' s theories are no exceptions. From the interventionist point of v iew, it's easy to 
appreciate the falsity of such counterfactual claim. It suffices to intervene and 'break the 
arrow'7 (if fig. l) bet,.veen C and E, vvhile leaving the arrovv fi·om C to E, intact. This would 
show that there' s no causation betvveen the E's, as there' s no 'causal arrow' betvveen them 
given that intervening on one of them does not affect the other. From Levvis's perspective, 
vve have that the possible vvorld that is the closest to the actual vvorld8 is one vvhere C occurs 
and everything is happening just I ike it does in the actual vvorld up to a point in time prior to 
E/ s occurrence, when suddenly a miracle occurs and E, does not occur, but E, does. l\Jovv, since 
in this possible world the antecedent "-.O(E,)" is true, but its consequent "-.O(E,)" false, and 
since this is the closest vvorld to the actual vvorld, vve have that the claim "-.O(E) ® -.O(E,)" 
is fa! se, thus saving the problem of spurious correlations. 
This example shovvs, and Woodvvard notes this, that Levvis' s small, local miracles serve a 
similar purpose to that of interventions in the manipulability theory. It also shows hovv d ivergent 
both approaches are; Woodward has no use whatsoever of possible-vvorld semantics, let alone a 
relation of similarity betvveen worlds. This, in turn, stresses the question of vvhat constitutes an 
intervention, and hovv are they characterized within the manipulab ility theory framevvork. This 
is the task of the next section. 
' Woodward employs directed graphs to represent relations of direct causation. Note that this 'breaking' interven-
tion need not consist in an intervention on C's values, but some other exogenous node can be employed, e.g. a node D such 
that it causes El to not-occur. 
8 There is extensive 1 iterature on vvhether such a possible world is real ly the closest to the actual vvorld . 
I will not dwell on this issue here. 
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2. INTERVENTION AND CoUNTERFACTUALS 
Let us recall the counterfactual formulation "ve did above of the sufficient and necessary 
conditions for causation according to the manipulability account. 
l. sc*: If "X o- Y" is true, then X causes Y 
2. NC*: If X causes Y, then "X o- Y" is true. 
Let us now focus on what I consider to be t he most interesting case. sc•, where "ve go from a 
true counterfactual to a true causal claim. We have already seen that the types of counte1-factuals 
involved are those associated "vith hypothetical interventions. Wood .. vard suggests, as means of 
testing the truth-value of a counterfactual claim, to actually carry out the intervent ions that the 
antecedent of the subjunct ive claim states. This intervention "vould exornine if a correlation 
bet..,veen the so-cal led cause and t he so-called effect does hold ( z. e. if information about a pattern is 
found). If it does hold in a significant number of cases, it "vould be fa ir to take t he counterfactual 
being analyzed as t rue: "The existence of a correlation bet..veen X and Y that pers ist s under 
the interventions specified in the antecedent of this counterfactual is in turn evidence that 
the counterfactual is true" (Wood..,vard 2003 105). To zntervene vvould be. therefore, to elucidate 
the content of a counterfactual claim confronted to causal claims. When one intervenes, the 
intervention contained in the antecedent of the subjunctive conditional is then actually carried 
out: 1f the consequent does not obtain, "ve would have evidence of its fa! sehood: 1f the consequent 
does obtain (under systematic interventions), "ve "vould have evidence of its truth. This test, 
then. 1s a sort of transfo1-mation of the counterfactual claim into a mnter1al imp! icat1on, "vhere 
ou1· 1ntervent1on sets the value of the antecedent in "true" and stipulates the truth-value of the 
"vhole claim 1n function of the consequent's truth-value. 
We seem to be begging the original question, however. for ho"v can such testing be performed 
in cases where actu.al intervention is not within our reach? These are the sort of cases that 
the manipulability nccount needs to save if it is to be of any interest. Woodwa1-d an5"vers this 
question appeal 1ng to a d ifferent "vay of representing causal relationships other than directed 
graphs: systems of structural equations (often employed in physics as well as econometrics). 
Uni ike directed graphs, these systems of equations not only point to t he ex istence of causal 
relations an1ong variables. but also encode information about ho"v a variable vvould change as 
a funct ion of change in some other var iable (Wood..,vard 2003 43). This resembles the notion 
of mathematical function, .. vhere given certain input, an output is g iven as a result of certain 
computat ions carried out fo ll owing specific rul es. This resemblance is best 
noted by Judea Pearl when in a foo tnote he t ell s us: "Every mathematicoJ 0 
function is interpreted hypothetically, and the study of counterfactual s is 
merely a study of standard mathematical functions" (2000 ). Let us illustrate 
this point with the fo llowing example due to Wood..,vard himself Let's sny 
we hnve three variables: 0 ('"there is oxygen present"). S ("there 1s a short-
c1rcu1t") nnd F ("there 1s fire"). Assume that the circumstances are such thnt C 
both 0 and S nre necessary causes of F, but separately not sufficient. A 
directed graph representation "vould be as fig. 2 . 
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The graph (if. fig. z), hovvever, doesn't capture the fact that both 0 and C must happen in 
order for F to happen. As a matter of fact, the graph shovvs both 0 and C to be sufficient causes, 
which is not the case. A structural equation does a better job at representing such relations. If 
we assign the values of o and r to the variables according to whether there's oxygen or not, etc., 
we can see that the follovv ing equation captures the appropriate relations: 
F = SxO 
Here vve can see that in the absence of one of the necessary causes, t he value of F vvill be 
zero regardless of the value of the o ther variable. In an analogous manner, if both causes do 
happen, then the result vv ill be that the effect also happens (r x r equals r ). A similar situation 
occurs in the case of equations in Physics. Even it is true that vve are unable to actual ly intervene 
on the orbital path of the Moon, or on it s mass, vve can never theless perform a hypothetical 
intervent ion employing the mathematical models of Newtonian equations, such as the Law of 
Universal Gravitation: 
Woodvvard vvould hold that this equation prov ides means to evaluate the truth of t he 
counterfac tual cla im: "If t he Moon vvere at tvvice the distance from Earth, it vvould exert less 
force on the tides". O ne vvould only have to employ the above equation and multiply r times 
tvvo. Once t he values of t he variables are crunched in, and the resul t ing value of F is computed, 
all that is left is comparing the result of t his F' with the 'normal' value of F ( i e. vvhen r is 
not mul t iplied times tvvo). If F' < F, then vve have evidence of the truth of the counterfactual 
cla im above. The fact that structural equations of this kind encode counterfactual informat ion 
a llows us to see what vvould happen if change in one or another variable vvere to take place, 
and in v irtue of this is that vve can judge the verac ity or plausibility of counterfactual cla ims. 
So it is clear t hat t he kind of interventions carried out vvhen actual intervention is impossible 
is interventions in a model; given such a model of the actual vvorld, vve can introduce values 
on variables that actually were not assig ned to them (our introduction vvould therefore be 
'against the facts', z.e counterfactual) and examine vvhat resul t our model provides, whether 
it conforms or not to the consequent of a subjunct ive cond itional claim. The plausibil ity of 
this counterfactua l claim, I th ink, is then derived fi·om the mer its of the model employed. 
Naturally, if it is an accepted, accurate model, t hen its results vvould g ive vvider plausib ility 
to claims verified by it. I n a defense of man ipulat ionist theorie s aguinst Nancy Cartvvr ight' s 
(2002) objection t hat manipulationist accounts are "operational ist" (sing! ing ou t just one 
procedure of testing), Woodward (2008) maintains that manipulation ist accounts do not deny 
that some other procedures fo r testing causal claims are possible. G iven the str ict relat ion 
betvveen causal cla ims and counter-factual cla ims, t his seems to imply that there may be other 
procedures fo r test ing counterfactual claims, compat ible vv ith the manipulation ist approach. 
But vvhat such an approach could be is not pursued by Woodvvard. This puts an enormous 
we ight on the role played by representations of causal rel ations, i.e d irected graphs and more 
specially, structural equations. 
Hovvever, it is interesting to note that vve cannot guarantee the truth-value of a counterfactual 
being supported by these mathematical models, insofar as there is no vvay to tell if such models are 
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the models of hovv the actual vvorld works. The truth-value assigned to the counterfactual claim 
vvould be just 1 ike the truth-value of a scientific hypothesis that has been verified a g iven number of 
times. Also .. at this point, we can turn Woodvvard's purported goal vvith the man ipulability theory 
against him. We have seen that such a t heory relies on use of models, sc ient ific ones presumably, 
to give an accoun t of cases vvhere actual manipulation is outside the scope of our capabilities. But 
is this really t he content of causal claims? It may be obvious to be the content of causal claims 
vvithin scientific practice, but is it also t he use of models constitutive of the content of everyday 
causal claims? Woodvvard argued t hat Levvis is account vvasn' t in par t appropriate for this reason; 
now h is accoun t could be said to al so be insufficient on the same ground. It is simply not obv ious, 
or even plaus ible, that o ne has to knotu such models to knoiu that a given counterfactual is true 
or fa] se. I can be sure that if I were to jump off a cliff, I vvould die, reg-ardless of my knovvledge 
of aerodynamics, Earth's g ravi tational constant or my body's b iology. How does Woodvvard's 
account of fi nding out a counter fac tual's truth const itutes also an elucidation of the content of 
all causal cla ims needs further argumentation. But even if such argumentation is provided, it 
is hard not to think that it will be somevvhat farfe tched. Perhaps, it could be said, the normative 
aspect of Woodvvard's account enters here; vvhen a subject utters a causal claim, she should be 
in a position to determine hovv t he effect vvould change or vary under in tervent ion o n the cause; 
i. e she should possess zriformation about hovv such change remains invarian t under some possible 
manipulations. But vvhat vvould constitute this information? Possession of a structural model? 
Furthermore, if the manipulability theory's most interesting appl ication. counterfactual cases, 
is inconsistent vvi th the theory's main goal, semantic elucidation, it is not clear vvhat value such 
theory can end up having. T he fac t that it is an essen tially non-reductive account of causation 
would strip it of any philosophical interest, if t he previous assertions turn out to be true. 
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